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 Sophisticated agents with self-control problems value commitment devices 
that constrain future choices. Using Australian household data I test whether these 
households value commitmentdevices in the form of illiquid pension contributions. 
Applying variousprobabilistic choice models, the results confirmthe conjecturethat 
households with problems of self-control are more likely to invest in illiquid 
pensions while less likely to hold very liquid forms of assets.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Sophisticated agents with self control problems value commitment devices 
that constrain future choices.  While most economists would probably agree with this 
statement, empirical evidence is thin on the ground.  Using theory and evidence 
drawn from the literature in psychology and behavioral economics to motivate the 
analysis,  this paper presents empirical  evidence  to support the contention that 
households with problems of self-control value commitment devices.  The underlying 
premise is that consumers with problems of self-control are not naïve and to some 
extent recognize the desirability of tying their hands in the future; the degree to which 
they succeed in doing so depends upon their level of sophistication
1. For example, 
individuals may simultaneously exhibit impatient behaviour with respect to, say, 
accumulating credit-card debt and patient behaviour with respect to contributing to 
retirement accounts through pension funds.
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between self-control problems 
and purchase of an illiquid asset that has the feature of a commitment device. First, a 
measure of impatience is constructed to capture self-control problems, and the simple 
relationships between this measure and various demographic and household 
characteristics are presented.  Second, the relationship between this measure and 
various asset classes, including pension contributions, is investigated using 
appropriate statistical techniques.  A fundamental result from the experimental 
psychology literature is that not only do individuals behave impatiently but they also 
behave in a time inconsistent manner and can be said to exhibit a ‘reversal of 
preferences’.   Much of the behavioral economics literature has focused on the 
extreme assumptions of ‘sophistication’ or ‘naïveté’.  In the present context, the 
sophistication assumption has testable implications because sophisticated individuals 
appreciate the existence of commitment devices that they use to commit to a course of 
action today such that this commitment precludes future incarnations of their selves 
from behaving in a time inconsistent manner. Conversely, the naïveté assumption 
does not immediately lead to such testable hypotheses because these individuals are 
observationally equivalent to those who could merely have a high (constant) rate of 
time preference.  The hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that a commitment device 
is more likely to be adopted by sophisticated hyperbolic households and that, the 
   
1Sophistication in this context refers to individuals who are aware of their self-control problems.  In 
the literature on hyperbolic preferences, sophisticated agents are those who are aware that they will 
behave in a time-inconsistent manner in the future.3
greater the problems of self control, the more likely are households to contribute to an 
illiquid asset. 
I test the hypothesis using data from the 1998-99 wave of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Household Expenditure Survey (HES).  The Australian 
experience is valuable in this context because restrictions on early withdrawal of 
voluntary  pension contributions, which became almost total in 1999, make this a 
highly illiquid form of saving.   Illiquid saving, in the form of voluntary contributions 
to superannuation is found to be partially correlated with a measure of impatience 
constructed using proxies for impatient behaviour such as smoking, drinking, 
gambling, and whether a household has credit card debt, after controlling for 
household demographic characteristics, life-cycle considerations and other control 
variables.   Individuals knowing themselves to have problems of self-control tie their 
hands by saving in illiquid assets, but the degree to which they succeed in doing this 
depends upon their education, wealth and other household characteristics.
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, I review some of the literature 
on time preference and the notion of sophistication and pre-commitment.  Section 3 
briefly outlines the institutional background of Superannuation in Australia. Section 4 
describes the empirical methodology and in Section 5 the empirical results are 
presented.  Section 6 concludes.
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
Both the concepts of impatience and sophistication are central to the empirical 
analysis in this paper.  In this section, some of the literature on time preference, from 
both the psychology and economics perspectives, is reviewed to motivate the 
techniques used in identifying a proxy of impatience and self-control.  In the second 
sub-section, I present some theoretical and empirical evidence on the concept of 
sophistication and its role in individual/household planning and behavior.
II.1.  Time preference and impatience.
Fundamental to the study of intertemporal choice is the extent to which agents 
care less about the future. While it is difficult to extract information on individuals’ or 
households’ rate of time preference from expenditure survey data, it is nonetheless 
important to account for differences in time preference and self-control across
households.  Any analysis involving the examination of individuals’ choice behavior 
over time, necessarily involves a treatment of discount rate heterogeneity. The 
importance of identifying impatience is relevant for economics from the view that 4
certain behaviors involve trade-offs between current costs and future benefits.  Costs 
in this context may not merely be monetary but psychological, while expected 
benefits may include better health status and a reduction in the probability of 
mortality as in the case of smoking and drinking 
In economics, the standard approach to discounting has been modeled with 
an exponential discount function that assumes a constant discount rate between each 
adjacent period. The assumption of a constant rate of time preference necessarily 
implies behavior that is time-consistent. In the last decade, however, beginning with 
Laibson [1997], economists have been increasingly concerned with more realistic 
assumptions about individuals’ intertemporal behavior.  The idea that agents behave 
in a time-inconsistent manner has been successfully incorporated into intertemporal 
optimization settings which has led to different predictions to the standard models.  A 
widely used discount function (beginning with Phelps and Pollack [1968] and more 
recently Laibson [1997]) that captures time inconsistency is quasi-hyperbolic.  For 
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While earlier economics papers have identified time-inconsistent behavior 
[Strotz, 1956; Phelps and Pollack, 1968], it is the psychology profession that has done 
the most for advancing our knowledge of time-inconsistent behavior at the individual 
level.  The identification of time preference rates and impatience (impulsivity) has 
been investigated extensively in the psychology literature with many studies, mostly 
clinical experiments, finding that discount functions for delay discounting are 
hyperbolic, rather than exponential.
2 In general, preferences over a delayed reward 
have been found to be characterized by a hyperbolic discount function, where the 
present value of a reward “increase(s) by an increasingly larger proportion per unit 
time as the reward approaches” [Kirby, 1997].  This type of discount function best 
characterizes time-inconsistent and present-biased behavior.
Most studies in the experimental psychology literature have been primarily 
concerned with hypothetical monetary payoffs and higher discount rates have been 
found to be correlated with behavior such as smoking, drinking and gambling 
[Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998; Bickel et al, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Petry, 2001; Petry 
   
2See Ainslie [1992, 2001], Thaler [1981] and Kirby [1997] for reviews.5
and Casarella, 1999].
3 Several studies also indicate that individuals with dual 
addictive disorders have extremely high discounting rates and that a hyperbolic 
discount function best characterises their temporal discounting
4.  I rely on these 
results as evidence that gambling is associated with impatience and that gambling, 
together with smoking and drinking, provides a reasonable indicator of self-control 
problems. Since many of these behaviors are also associated with risk tolerance, the 
implication is that impatience and risk tolerance are in fact related.  This view is 
consistent with the literature on personality theory which equates impulsivity with 
preferences for such things as immediate gratification, risky activities, drug usage, and 
novel sensations, among others [Mitchell, 1999].   
On the other hand, the economics literature on the measurement of time 
preference has primarily started from the time-consistency assumption and, as such, 
attempts have been made to quantify the constant rate of time preference [for 
example, Fuchs, 1982; Lawrance, 1991; Barsky et al, 1997].  The results from these 
studies suggested that education and income were negatively related to time 
preference while smoking and credit card debt on which interest was paid were 
positively related to time preference.
5
II.2. Sophistication and Precommitment 
Of most relevance to this study is the finding that humans, while exhibiting 
preferences that are characterised by present-bias, are also observed to be engaging in 
long-term planning behavior that would imply a non-myopic perspective [Monterosso 
and Ainslie, 1999].  This feature is consistent with aspects of self-control and, in the 
present framework, sophistication.  The implication is that, while agents have 
hyperbolic discount functions, they are also capable of recognising their weaknesses 
for immediate gratification and make efforts to offset or thwart them by making use of 
precommitment devices, such as long-term saving products, even though they may, in 
certain cases, have lower rates of return than other investment instruments.
In Strotz’s [1956] famous paper, consumer behavior under the assumption of 
sophistication is investigated and contrasted to that of naïveté.  In particular, he 
proposes that individuals are born with time-inconsistent preferences and that, 
   
3While it appears clear that problem gamblers discount more heavily than non-problem gamblers, it is 
not so clear whether some gambling is indicative of high discounting.
4There is some evidence that there is not a single impulsiveness trait that links an inability to delay 
gratification with a tendency to gamble and take risks.  This result is confirmed in studies that 
investigate separately the discounting of delayed rewards and probabilistic rewards [Myerson et al, 
2003;  Holt et al, 2003].  However, Green et al [1999] suggest that although the processes that underlie 
the types of discounting are not identical, they are “fundamentally similar”.
5The relationship between time preference and credit card debt in Fuchs [1982] was positive but not 
statistically significant.6
through  avenues such as parental training and social pressure, these ‘thrifty’   
individuals can either replace their innate, time-inconsistent preferences with time-
consistent ones (in which case there is no need for precommitment) or, being aware of 
their time-inconsistency, value the strategy of precommitment.  The second group –
the ‘spendthrifts’ – consists of those that through, for example, lack of education or 
training, behave purely in a time-inconsistent manner.  This group will not make use 
of commitment devices. 
More recent literature on life-cycle consumption models attempts to 
incorporate realistic time preference structures gleaned from the psychology literature 
outlined above and explicitly allows for time-inconsistent preferences.  Laibson et al 
[2000], using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics and the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, identify some stylized facts about individuals in the United States, including 
that consumers hold high levels of illiquid wealth while simultaneously holding high 
levels  of credit card debt; such consumers behave patiently while accumulating 
illiquid wealth but impatiently with respect to credit card debt. In a simulated life-
cycle model, they find that time-inconsistent preferences can better explain the 
observed financial data than can the usual exponential discounting models. This 
behavior, they find, is consistent with a sophisticated hyperbolic consumer who is 
‘tying her hands’ from splurging today and therefore can potentially reduce, to some 
extent, her desire for present gratification.  Similarly, Laibson et al. [1998] investigate 
the role of partially illiquid, defined contribution pension plans as a commitment 
device for sophisticated hyperbolics.  
To the extent that saving in Superannuation and Annuities represents future 
consumption in retirement years and thus foregone consumption today, standard life-
cycle models predict that saving and impatience should be negatively correlated.  The 
crucial difference when time-inconsistency is assumed is that contributions to 
Superannuation and Annuities, while representing additions to saving, also serve the 
purpose of an external commitment mechanism and have  the function of pre-
committing to a plan of action.  One of the key predictions of the hyperbolic model is 
that sophisticated hyperbolic households should value the external commitment and 
therefore ‘impatience’ should be found to be positively related to the probability of 
investing in Superannuation and Annuities.
I am concerned with the characteristics of households that invest in 
Superannuation and Annuities.  While there are many factors that influence the 
decision to invest in an illiquid asset, the hypothesis tested here is that it is far-sighted, 
sophisticated hyperbolic agents that will choose to do so.  Since illiquid asset 7
investment captures patient behavior and if agents are sophisticated, I expect to 
observe a positive relationship between this type of patient behavior and the proxies 
for impatience, after controlling for variables that account for sophistication and other 
socio-demographic household characteristics.
Thaler and Shefrin [1981] approach the same problem in a different way. They 
do not rely on time discounting to characterize the observed paradox of simultaneous 
patient and impatient behavior by individuals.  Rather, they model the consumer as a 
dual-self organization, similar to a principal-agent problem.  This framework allows 
for conflict to exist within the person where the two ‘selves’ have conflicting 
objective functions.  This analysis is extended by Fudenberg and Levine [2004] who 
model a similar individual but in a game-theoretic framework.  The predictions of the 
two models are similar and lead to the same predictions as the hyperbolic model albeit 
through a different mechanism.  The dual-self model of Thaler and Shefrin, however, 
provides better intuition for the idea of sophistication and pre-commitment.
In the Thaler and Shefrin model the individual is represented as consisting of a 
myopic short-run self – the doer – and a patient long-run self – the planner.  The 
conflict arises because the planner has the long term in mind while the doer is 
completely absorbed with the current period’s utility. The planner doesn’t consume 
but, rather, derives utility from the consumption of the doers.  However, the planner 
cannot implement this plan without imposing some controls on the doer. Without 
some constraints on the doer’s actions, the doer would overconsume and consume 
life-time income in the first period.  The way in which the planner imposes control is 
by way of a psychic technology capable of affecting the doer’s behavior.    The extent 
to which rules can successfully be employed to alter the doer’s behavior depends on 
the level of sophistication of the individual.  In the extreme case, all doer discretion 
can be eliminated by imposing rules that emulate perfect pre-commitment or perfect 
commitment devices – perfect in the sense that the rules can approximate the choices 
that the planner would make.  
What determines sophistication and how do we measure it?  Intuitively, 
sophistication is expected to be determined by such things as education, family 
background in the form of parental training, wealth and income.  Indeed, Thaler and 
Shefrin suggest that the rules which individuals adopt to mitigate the desires of the 
short-run self are learned from parents and other models.  They further suggest that 
“there will be differences in the use of rules depending on social class, education and 
age” [1981, p.398].8
Conversely, we could assume that individuals have an endowed level of 
‘impatience’ but rather than expending effort reducing it, as in Becker and Mulligan 
[1997], individuals expend effort reducing their time-inconsistency.  This approach is 
consistent with Strotz’s argument discussed above.  We could interpret this as making 
an effort to increaseb in equation (1), since  1 = b is the time consistent case nested 
in the quasi-hyperbolic function. This can be thought of as leading to the 
sophistication assumption.  Given this assumption of “endogenous sophistication”, 
individuals then have the choice of relying on internal commitment mechanisms as in 
Benhabib and Bisin [2004] or of making use of (perhaps simpler) external 
commitment devices, such as illiquid assets, to help to ensure that their short-run self 
stays on track.  
Related to the notion of commitment is the empirical work on retirement 
planning.  Lusardi [2003] explores the wealth accumulation of persons close to 
retirement and their active planning for retirement and finds that those who plan for 
retirement also have a higher level of pre-retirement wealth, after controlling for 
preferences, demographic factors and permanent income.  In the terminology of 
Thaler and Shefrin, this is an example of the long-term planner imposing some rules 
on the myopic doer so that the planner’s long-term goals are implemented.  Lusardi 
further finds that those who plan are more likely to have higher education than those 
who don’t.  Ameriks et al [2003], using a tailor-made survey to capture the propensity 
to plan,  report the same relationship between planning and wealth accumulation. 
These examples are consistent with the concept of sophistication used here; 
sophisticated agents are more likely to plan for retirement.  In a related study, 
Ameriks et al [2004] find that problems of self-control are negatively related to 
wealth accumulation – both liquid and illiquid – but find that self-control problems 
will have a greater (negative) effect on the accumulation of liquid financial assets than 
on retirement accumulation where the assets are typically accumulated in pension 
funds and are more illiquid.
6
III.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Retirement income provision for Australian households comprises three 
pillars. First is the  public pension with universal coverage, but asset and means 
tested. Second is the Superannuation Guarantee, a mandatory retirement saving plan 
   
6Ameriks et al [2004] suggest that “the impact of self-control problems should vary according to the 
liquidity characteristics of the underlying assets…In particular, it should be hard for those with self-
control problems to accumulate financial assets outside their retirement account.”9
which compels all employers to contribute, on behalf of their employees, a percentage
of the employee’s wages on top of wages (7 per cent in 1998/9) into a private account. 
It is a fully funded, private system where employer contributions are fully preserved 
until minimum retirement age. Third is voluntary saving, which can include housing, 
financial assets and voluntary contributions into individual Superannuation accounts.
The taxation arrangements for Superannuation are complex but concessional. 
Voluntary contributions to individual accounts are not tax deductible unless 
employer-sponsored contributions are not available, for example, for the self-
employed.  While personal contributions are not tax-deductible, earnings in the hands 
of  funds are taxed at concessional rates and  tax is not levied on undeducted 
contributions upon exit at retirement  While there is some provision for encouraging 
voluntary contributions, there are also disincentives or, rather, perhaps not enough 
incentives to alter individuals’ participation decisions.
8 In the analysis that follows, I 
investigate and identify the co-determinants of voluntary contributions to 
Superannuation.
An important feature for this paper is the illiquidity of superannuation 
contributions in Australia, whether under the Superannuation Guarantee or voluntary.  
After 1992 the importance of saving for retirement was heavily publicized by the 
government.  Legal restrictions on early withdrawal were tightened, such that by 1999 
both compulsory employer and voluntary employee contributions into Superannuation 
accounts were preserved within the system and could not be accessed until the 
minimum retirement age.
9
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
What are the models’ predictions of the relationship between impatience and 
illiquid wealth?  First, if the world is populated exclusively by exponential consumers, 
then we would expect that higher impatience decreases the probability of holding 
superannuation and annuities since the more short-sighted the less value is placed on 
future consumption.  Second, if the world is populated by naïve hyperbolic 
consumers, these individuals do not value commitment and therefore the more 
   
7Minimum retirement age depends on year of birth; the maximum is currently age 60 for the younger 
cohorts. From 1 July 1999, both compulsory employer and voluntary employee contributions into 
Superannuation accounts are preserved within the system and cannot be accessed until the minimum 
retirement age.  However, special hardship conditions will enable early release of funds under very 
exceptional circumstances
8.For example, from August 1996 a contributions surcharge of 15 per cent, was introduced for high-
income individuals.  
9Special hardship conditions will enable early release of funds only under very exceptional 
circumstances10
impatient, the less likely they will be to hold illiquid assets.  Third, if agents are 
modelled according to the dual-self model of Thaler and Shefrin, and if the short-run 
self is impatient and the long-run self patient, then we expect to see a conflict between 
the two selves, and higher impatience will be positively related to the probability of 
holding  Superannuation and annuities.  Finally, if individuals are sophisticated 
hyperbolics, they value commitment and impatient behavior will be positively related 
to the probability of holding illiquid assets
The data used are from the 1998-99 wave of the ABS Household Expenditure 
Survey (HES), which is a cross-sectional survey of approximately 7000 Australian 
households and contains data on demographics, education, occupation, sources of 
income and detailed expenditure items.  The reporting unit is the household rather 
than the individual and therefore, as is usual in survey data on income and 
expenditure, the analyses are in terms of the household reference person.   I remove 
households where there are multiple families and restrict the sample to households 
where the reference person is between 25 years of age and less than 75 years of age.  
Further, I retain only households where financial decisions are determined as a single 
income unit.  For example, this may include both spouses working but for decision 
purposes it is as though there is only one source of income. In this way we capture 
only single family or single household income and expenditure.  Since contributions 
to superannuation can only be made if employed, households whose reference person 
is unemployed or not working are removed.  The resulting sample consists of 3491 
households, of which 1684 make voluntary contributions to Superannuation and 
Annuities and 1807 do not.
IV.1. Measuring Impatience
A measure for impatience is central to the empirical tests.  A proxy variable is 
constructed that accounts for household differences in time preference (impatience).
The HES contains detailed data on household expenditure items, and a number of 
expenditure items are identified in the data that have been found to be correlated with 
impatience and which qualify for inclusion based on the studies cited above. These 
include expenditure on smoking, drinking, gambling, and credit card interest 
payments as an indicator for the presence of credit card debt.
10 I construct indicators 
   
10 As described above, experimental psychology tests reveal that smoking, drinking and gambling are 
associated with a higher rate of time preference compared to non-participation and, in particular, that it 
is a hyperbolic discount function that best characterises delay discounting in these experiments. The 
proxies could be criticized on the grounds that these behaviors could be capturing individual risk 
preferences rather than impatience.  However, it has been found that these risky behaviors can also 
explain impulsivity and are in fact related [Mitchell, 1999; Monterosso and Ainslie, 1999; and Barsky 
et al, 1997].11
for these behaviors since I am primarily interested in whether these behaviors are 
observed rather than how much is spent on them.
11 Assuming that underlying these 
behaviors is impatience, or problems of self-control, I use principal component 
analysis to identify a common factor that relates these behaviors to a latent trait 
variable – impatience – and therefore create an aggregate impatience index to include 
in the empirical analysis.    
All the impatience proxies used are dichotomous and so the usual correlation 
matrix is not strictly valid.  To correct this I use a correlation matrix based on 
tetrachoric correlations between the variables, i x , that explicitly accounts for the 
discrete nature of the impatience proxies and then perform principal component 
analysis  (PCA).  PCA linearly transforms a set of p  variables into another set of 
p k £ uncorrelated variables that explains the total variation in the original set.  It is 
similar to factor analysis, but in factor analysis the aim is to explain the common 
variance, rather than the total variance, between the observed variables.  In PCA the 
focus is to express the principal component as a linear function of the  i x [Dunteman, 
1989]
12
Tables I and II summarize the principal component analysis, and Tables III 
and IV summarize the resulting impatience index.  If the observed behaviors are all 
capturing impatience, they will be positively correlated.  Table V presents pairwise 
and partial correlations between the four measures.  All correlations are positive and 
most are statistically significant.  Since true impatience is a latent variable and thus 
unobservable, I use this constructed index as a proxy for impatience and believe that it 
will be positively correlated with the true, unobservable impatience trait.
13  
IV.2. Illiquid and Liquid Assets
   
11 Expenditure is at the household not at the individual level so it is impossible to disentangle whether, 
for example, all the members smoke or just one of them.  My impatience index therefore is for a given 
household.  Data on consumption levels of these items is also not available.
12 As a robustness check, I construct an additional five impatience indices based on a) factor analysis 
using the score, b) factor analysis using the factor loadings to weight the variables, c) principal 
component analysis using the score, d) principal component analysis using the factor loadings as
weights and finally e) the sum of the indicators on the four impatience variables using equal weighting.  
There is no appreciable difference in the results when the five methods are used
13 To qualify as a proxy two conditions need to be met:  First, is thatthe proxy be redundant if included 
with  q , that is,  ) , | ( ) , , | ( q x y E z q x y E = , where  q is an unobservable variable and  z is a proxy for 
q .  y is the dependant variable and  x is a vector of observable covariates. The second condition is 
that we require the correlation between q and each element of  x be zero once we partial out z
[Wooldridge, 2002].  12
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to unity if a household makes 
voluntary contributions to Superannuation and Annuities, and zero otherwise.
14 It is 
not the sole measure of illiquid saving since there are other illiquid assets identified in 
the HES which could be effective saving vehicles.  It is important to stress that this 
analysis examines the probability of investing in an illiquid asset as a way of 
constraining future choices of households.    Annuities, while not as illiquid as 
superannuation, are characterised by long-term returns and early withdrawal often 
involves negative returns since administration costs are typically high in the early 
years of the plan, including this should therefore pose no problem.
The HES contains flows from assets such as stocks, bank deposits, and other 
property as well as whether a household is a homeowner and the value of the home. I 
include dummy variables for whether a household holds any assets in these forms as 
well as interaction terms between the dummies and the income flows from these 
assets. These can serve as proxies for ‘taste for saving’ since in general, households 
that have investment income are most likely to have saved the assets to generate that 
income, or simply, as discussed below, as proxies for household wealth.  Given the 
different liquidity characteristics of these assets, it is also of interest to see how the 
probability of holding these assets is related to the impatience proxy.
15
IV.3. Sophistication
I include a number of variables that can be thought of as proxies for 
sophistication such as education qualification attained, wealth, in the form of dwelling 
value, and indicators for whether a household has income from investments.  These 
variables for wealth can be included since the income flows in the current period 
relate to investment decisions in a previous period.  Therefore these wealth proxies 
are treated as predetermined variables.  In addition, occupation categories are 
included since these could be capturing social class or the effect of peers both of 
which can contribute to an individual’s general sophistication.  These variables are 
intrinsically entwined with future earning potential, or permanent income, and 
therefore any significant positive relationship between superannuation and these 
variables could also be revealing that the rich save more [Dynan et al, 2004].
   
14 This variable potentially includes individuals working in the public sector where compulsory “quasi-
voluntary” employee contributions form part of the salary package.  However, households report 
voluntary contributions in expenditure diaries as disbursements and it is therefore most likely that these 
contributions are made after quasi-voluntary contributions are deducted from the pay.
15 The HES is not an ideal data set for analysing household saving.  Unlike the similar and frequently 
used Consumer Expenditure Survey in the United States, the HES suffers from issues in the timing of 
income and consumption.  Taste for saving can be captured in the error term or across discount rate 
heterogeneity through the impatience index.  13
I classify the household reference person into four broad education groups; the 
control group is High school dropouts, those that have completed  high school as their 
highest qualification, those with intermediate qualifications such as basic vocational 
and associate diploma, and those with a bachelor’s degree or higher.   As well as 
being a proxy for sophistication, education attainment can also be capturing future 
earning potential and thus, permanent income.
The HES does not contain any detailed data on the wealth holdings of 
households, except for dwelling value, but does contain data on flows from assets 
such as rental income from property, dividend income from stocks and interest 
income from bank deposits.  In all my specifications I ignore liabilities and focus 
instead on flows from these assets.  Additionally, since for many households the 
family home is their primary asset and the main source of retirement saving, gross 
dwelling value is included as an additional proxy variable for wealth holding. Given 
that the primary residence is the next most illiquid asset, it is of interest whether the 
probability of investing in Superannuation and Annuities decreases with higher values 
of the primary residence since some substitutability between Superannuation and 
home value would be expected. 
IV.4. Demographics
Demographic variables affect the need for saving and are potentially important 
sources of variation in saving at the micro level.  Including variables on family 
composition, such as gender, family size and marital status as control variables are 
important for analysing life cycle saving decisions.
16 Also, controlled for are nine 
broad employment categories.  The control group is Labourers and associated 
workers. In addition to controlling for household before-tax income, I include 
dummy variables to indicate the primary source of household income, these are: 
Wages and Salaries, Self-employed,  Investments and Government benefits which is 
the control group. 
When analysing investment in Superannuation and Annuities cohort effects 
and life-cycle effects may be relevant.  In particular, different cohorts may have had 
exposure to different retirement schemes, or the need for current retirement saving 
may not be as crucial since they have already accumulated sufficient or age may alter 
the perception of what is a necessary level of funds for retirement.  This last point 
may be of relevance to younger cohorts since they may have been exposed to different 
advertising related to the need for adequate retirement provision, while the older 
   
16 Marital status also includes couples living in a de-facto relationship.14
cohorts may not feel that any further commitment of funds for retirement purposes 
will alter their standard of living in old age
17.  Or simply, different cohorts have 
differing attitudes to saving.  This effect may in part have an impact through lifetime 
earnings since, in a growing economy, younger cohorts generally have higher current 
and lifetime income than earlier cohorts and hence save less than older cohorts.  Age 
can also capture aspects of sophistication and the ability to impose rules on the short-
run, impatient self as in Thaler and Shefrin. The HES data set contains indicators for 
the age category to which the household reference person belongs in five year bands.  
I construct an age variable as the midpoint of the age categories to create a continuous 
variable – this allows the inclusion of age and a quadratic in age.  
V. DATA AND RESULTS
This section provides a description of the data and the results of the empirical 
estimation.  First, I examine the simple relationships between impatience and other 
variables.  Second, and this is the fundamental result, I investigate the relationship 
between impatience and the probability of contributing to a very illiquid asset, 
Superannuation and Annuities.  Finally, I examine how impatience affects the 
probability of holding other forms of assets which are characterized by varying 
degrees of liquidity.
Tables  VI  and  VII  and Figures  I to  V, present some simple relationships 
between Impatience, Superannuation and Annuities, household income, a constructed 
measure of liquidity and various demographics from the HES.  In particular, the data 
reveal that: 
1. Impatience increases with income at low levels of income and then declines 
with higher levels of income.  Figures I  and  II  show, respectively, the 
relationship between impatience and deciles of household per capita income 
including  investment income and between impatience and deciles of 
household per capita income excluding investment income. A clear positive 
relationship up to around median per capita income turns negative and then 
stabilises in the upper deciles.  One conjecture for this positive relationship is 
that as household income increases, agents are more able to afford to indulge 
in the ‘vices’ that they would like to engage in but that low income had 
hitherto prevented them from.  At almost all income levels households making 
   
17 The introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee was accompanied by a widespread advertising 
campaign informing individuals of the introduction of the new scheme; it was difficult not to be aware 
of the new legislation.  In addition, the last several years have seen a burgeoning of media articles 
dealing with the need for adequate retirement provision.15
contributions to superannuation are more impatient than those that do not. 
Moreover, the finding that impatience appears to be positively related to 
household income at low income levels is in contrast to Lawrance’s [1991] 
finding that impatience and income are negatively related.
2. The relationship between impatience and age (Figure III) is roughly constant 
up to age group 35-39, after which it rises through middle age and then begins 
to decline into old age.  There is no noticeable difference between those with 
superannuation and those without.
18 Spearman rank correlation tests 
conducted for impatience with age and income reject the null hypothesis of 
independence for these two variables.  There are some conflicting arguments 
about the correlation of impatience with age.  On the one hand, as individuals 
age there is an accumulated experience that teaches individuals that patience 
may be a virtue.  On the other hand, as the end of life approaches, the distance 
between the current period and the end of life decreases and so there is the 
possibility that impatience increases since there is no longer any need to 
exercise patience – the planning horizon is much shorter.  
3. One of the most interesting features of the data is shown in Figure IV.  The 
relationship between education qualification and impatience reveals that 
impatience is strongly decreasing in education attainment.  This correlation is 
the strongest yet and lends some support to the Becker and Mulligan 
hypothesis that agents expend effort, partly through education, to reduce their 
impatience.  Fuchs [1982] and Lawrance [1991] also find this negative 
relationship. It is consistent with the proposal of sophistication and thus 
provides support for the use of education as a proxy for sophistication.  Figure 
IV  also captures the difference in impatience between those with 
superannuation and those without.  What is conspicuous is the obviously 
higher level of impatience for those making contributions to superannuation.  
T-tests of differences of average impatience levels between those with 
superannuation and those without for each education group are significant at 
the 5% level for all groups except group 2 (basic vocational) and groups 7 
(postgrad diploma) and 8 (higher degree). 
4. In Figure V, I compare the simple relationship between a measure of liquidity 
and impatience.  The liquidity measure is a constructed variable with five 
ordinal categories of illiquidity where the illiquid assets include 
superannuation contributions, home ownership and other property. The liquid 
   
18 The results for the age categories 9 and 10 with super are not valid since they include only 2 and 1 
observations respectively.16
assets include bank deposits and stocks.  Category 1 indicates that a given 
household holds all three types of illiquid assets found in the HES and holds 
no liquid assets, thus it is the most illiquid category.  Category 5 is the most 
liquid where a household holds only liquid assets – bank deposits and stocks 
from which dividends are received.  Categories 2 – 4 indicate households that 
hold combinations of assets with increasing degrees of liquidity.  The graph 
clearly reveals that liquidity is inversely related to impatience.
V.1. Impatience and contributions to illiquid wealth 
The central analysis in this paper is in the examination of the relationship 
between the probability of holding illiquid wealth and impatience.  A discrete choice 
model of participation in voluntary superannuation is specified.  It is assumed that 
each household’s participation decision can be described by a vector of socio-




i Imp X super e g b + + =
In general,
*
i super is unobservable.  What is observed is a dummy variable, defined as 
1 = i super if  0 >
*
i super , and  0 = i super otherwise.  The decision to participate in 
voluntary superannuation involves a random component, specifically, the probability 
that a household participates is
(3)
prob( ) 1 = i super = prob( ) 0 >
*
i super
= prob( ) g b e i i i Imp X - - >
=  ( ), 1 g b i i Imp X F - - -
where F is the cumulative distribution function for  i e which are assumed to follow a 
normal distribution. The parameters are then estimated by fitting a probit model to the 
1998 HES data.
19
The results in Table VIII show that, after controlling for many variables that 
could affect a household’s likelihood of contributing, impatience positively and 
significantly affects the probability of contributing to Superannuation and Annuities.  
This provides evidence consistent with sophistication in a household’s decision to 
invest in a long-term and very illiquid asset.
   
19 A logit model was also estimated for comparison.  The results were not dissimilar to the probit 
estimates and are not reported.17
Many of the demographic variables are related to the probability of 
contributing to Superannuation and Annuities in the expected way.  The coefficients 
on age and income are significantly positive, while being female decreases the 
probability of contributions. Marriage and family size while having the expected sign
are not statistically significant.
Relative to the base line category of High school dropouts, the three education 
classes are all positive but the Higher degree category has a significantly higher 
probability of affecting superannuation contributions.  In the occupation categories, 
compared to the control category of Labourers and related Workers, all are positive 
but only the “white collar” occupations are statistically significant.  
The asset dummies positively affect the probability of contributing to 
superannuation and annuities, although the property dummy is positive but not 
statistically significant.    The coefficients on the flows from these assets are all 
negative but only the coefficient on bank interest is significant.  Being a home owner 
is positive while the value of the home is negative.  As noted above, the presence of 
these other assets could be capturing taste for saving, while the negative coefficients 
on the flows could be capturing the effect of substitutability between assets types.   
That is, the higher the flows from these assets, the less likely a household is to 
contribute to superannuation since they have other assets upon which to rely.   An 
analogous interpretation can be applied to the Home owner dummy and Dwelling 
value.  The findings are consistent with some of the empirical regularities on 
household saving behaviour identified in Browning and Lusardi [1996].  
Underlying the estimation is the assumption that holding other assets is 
predetermined since investment flows capture investment decisions taken in earlier 
periods. Perhaps this assumption is too strong since there are unobserved household 
characteristics that affect both the decision to hold superannuation and the decisions 
to hold other types of assets.  The next section specifically accounts for the potential 
correlation in the unobservables by estimating the joint decision potentially inherent 
in asset choice using a multivariate probit model of portfolio choice. 
V.2.  Impatience and portfolio choice  
To the extent that households appreciate the existence of commitment in the 
form of illiquid assets, it is instructive to examine how holding other types of assets, 
each with varying levels of liquidity, are affected by my impatience measure.  This 
analysis also serves as a check on the predictions of the theory for sophisticated 
households, in the sense that impatience is expected to increase the probability of 18
holding illiquid assets and decrease the probability of holding liquid assets. 
Accordingly, I next examine how impatience affects the probability of holding four 
other types of assets.  
While contributions to an illiquid asset represent a commitment device, there 
are clearly other assets that a household may choose to hold.  In particular, households 
make decisions not only about superannuation, but also about other financial assets 
and home ownership.  Whereas in the preceding analysis the dependent variable was a 
dichotomous variable capturing whether a household made contributions to the 
illiquid asset, Superannuation and Annuities, in this sub-section the additional 
dependent variables are indicators that identify whether a given household already 
holds an asset rather than making additions to it.  The indicators for the different asset 
types are classified according to illiquidity: the most illiquid asset is Superannuation
and  Annuities, followed by being a home owner, holding property that generates 
rental income, holding stocks from which dividends are received and finally the most 
liquid are bank deposits. 
Explicitly allowed for are the joint decisions of holding different types of 
assets by estimating a multivariate probit model of portfolio choice.
20 In a 
multivariate probit framework, a 0-1 variable is observed for whether a given 
household holds each asset class and any correlations across the error terms due to 
unobservable household-specific factors can be accounted for.  If the error terms are 
uncorrelated across assets, individual standard single-equation  probits can be 
estimated.  Conversely, if the error terms are correlated, it is preferable to model the 
asset-holding decisions jointly as in the multivariate probit framework.  As is usual in 
the empirical literature on household portfolio choice, participation decisions are 
modelled as reduced form equations and the portfolio choice problem can therefore be 
modelled as a standard commodity choice problem [Hochguertel, Alessie and van 
Soest, 1997].
Defining an underlying latent propensity variable 
*
h Y for the participation in 
each of the five asset classes (h = super (S), home (H), stocks (St), bank (B), property 
(P)), these underlying propensities are related to the household’s observed 
characteristics  h X , with unknown coefficient vector  h b and other unobserved 
characteristics,  h e .  Assuming a linear relationship, the population regression function 
is
   
20 Multivariate probit estimation has been used in many fields from modeling joint decisions about 
portfolio choice [Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2001] to modeling participation in drugs [Zhao and 
Harris, 2004] among others.19
(4)
ih h ih h ih ih Imp X Y e g b + + =
' * ,
where h indexes the asset types and i indexes the household.  Individually equation 
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Given the potential substitutability or complementarity between these asset classes it 
is likely that the error terms of these equations will be correlated.  The multivariate 
probit model is estimated via simulated maximum likelihood on the 3491 
observations using the GHK algorithm [Greene, 2003]. The number of draws is set to 
60 which is approximately the square root of the number of observations.  Results for 
the multivariate probit analysis are presented in Table IX.
The multivariate results show that the impatience measure is positively and 
significantly related to holding Superannuation and Annuities, with the magnitude not 
greatly changed from the result in the previous single equation probit of Table VIII.  
Impatience appears to have no significant effect on the probability of holding the 
other forms of illiquid assets, homes and investment properties.  An explanation is 
that the decision to hold housing assets can be motivated by many different factors 
since housing serves the dual function of an investment and a generator of housing 
services [Arrondel and Lefebvre, 2001].  This result highlights the difficulty of 
identifying an illiquid asset with the primary property of tying the saver’s hands for a 
lengthy period of time, a feature captured by the Australian Superannuation and 
Annuities category.  
The effect of impatience on the probability of holding stocks and bank 
deposits – the two most liquid asset categories – is negative and significant for both,
so that more impatient households are less likely to hold these liquid assets. While 
this is the expected result, it is not possible to identify the type of household.  First, as 
previously discussed, sophisticated hyperbolic households are less likely to hold 
liquid assets, but naïve hyperbolics are also less likely to hold assets.  A similar 
argument can be applied to exponential discounters.  . Evidence presented in Lusardi 20
[2003], confirming her prior assumption that a higher rate of time preference is 
associated with a reduced probability in holding stocks, is consistent with the results 
found here.  Ameriks et al [2004] also confirm this result, finding that problems of 
self-control are associated with lower liquid wealth holdings. Consequently, while it 
is not conclusive which type of household we are identifying with this result, it is 
nonetheless consistent with the sophisticated hyperbolic hypothesis.  As mentioned 
above, the impatience index could be criticised on the grounds that it is capturing 
attitudes towards risk with the implication that a higher measure of the index is 
associated with more risk loving behavior. However, if this is the case, then the 
expected sign on the impatience coefficient for the probability of holding stocks 
should be positive rather than negative since it is generally accepted that stocks are the 
riskier type of asset.
Consistent with expectations, age has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of holding all asset types, except on the probability of holding stocks.  
This finding is supported by other studies [Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2001; 
Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995].  Also as expected, the coefficients on household income 
are all positive and statistically significant.  Being a female head of the household 
negatively affects the probability of holding all asset types, but only those for holding 
superannuation and stocks are statistically significant.  Marriage is also associated 
with an increase in the probability of holding all assets, except it is not significant for 
holding superannuation.    Household heads holding a Bachelors degree or higher 
(Higher Degree) have a higher probability of holding all five asset classes, other 
things being equal, compared to households with lower qualifications.  This may
reflect higher earning potential or higher wealth holdings for this group.  It may also 
reflect the fact that higher educated households have an information gathering 
advantage, and is thus consistent with sophistication. 
As shown at the bottom of Table IX, estimates of the error correlations, h r , 
from the multivariate probit are positive and significant for most pairs of equations, 
suggesting that most assets are at least complements to each other. The negative 
correlation between being a home owner and holding investment property is negative 
and unexpected since most property investors in the sample are also home owners, but
it is not statistically significant. The null hypothesis that the disturbance terms are 
uncorrelated across equations is rejected.  Since I include a proxy for time preference, 
any unobserved variation could be reflecting such other factors as risk preference, 
expectations about future income or returns and family background.  Overall, the 
results from the multivariate probit analysis in Table IX  confirm the results in the 21
single equation probit. The signs and significance of the coefficients on most 
variables are similar.
V.3. Impatience and liquidity
Finally, as an additional check on the relationship between impatience and 
illiquidity, I estimate a multinomial logit model using the liquidity categories outlined 
above.
21 The dependent variable categories are 0-1 variables representing the 5 
categories of liquidity plus a category for households that hold no assets.  Frequencies 
and distribution of the categories are presented in Tables X and XI.    The independent 
variables are the same as in the multivariate probit framework and the estimated 
coefficients are presented in Table XII.
For all categories, households with higher measured impatience are more likely 
to hold only illiquid assets as is revealed by the significant negative coefficient on the 
impatience index for all categories.  Only the most salient features of the remaining 
results will be discussed.  Table XII  shows that age has mixed results on the 
likelihood of holding various types of asset groups.  In particular, age significantly 
increases the probability of holding only illiquid assets relative to holding no assets 
(category 0) and holding mostly liquid assets (category 4), while it reduces the 
likelihood of holding only illiquid assets relative to holding mostly illiquid assets 
(category 2).  Households with higher income are more likely to hold only illiquid 
assets relative to holding no assets, which is to be expected.  Holding mostly illiquid 
assets (category 2) or an equal mix of liquid and illiquid (category 3) is more likely 
for higher income households than merely holding illiquid assets.  This is also 
consistent with other studies suggesting that higher income households have a more 
diversified portfolio.  They are also less likely to hold only liquid assets (category 5) 
relative to only illiquid assets.  The effects of education on asset holdings are also 
mixed:  households whose head has a bachelor’s degree or higher are more likely to 
hold only illiquid assets rather than no assets but less likely to hold only illiquid assets 
when compared to holding a mix of mostly illiquid assets. This is likely to be 
capturing the higher income levels for more educated households. Only household 
heads with high school or intermediate qualifications are significantly likely to hold 
mostly illiquid assets (category 2) relative to all illiquid.  After controlling for 
education and household income as well as various demographics, the results 
presented in Table XII provide additional support for the hypothesis that Australian 
   
21 The dependent variable has ordinal characteristics and thus an ordered probit model may seem more 
appropriate.  However, tests reveal that the parallel regressions assumption can be rejected therefore a 
multinomial logit is preferred.22
households in this sample are sophisticated rather than naïve with impatience 
generally increasing the probability of holding illiquid assets.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated how problems of self-control, as proxied by an index 
for impatience, can help explain the probability of Australian households investing in 
illiquid assets.  Evidence was found to support the contention that problems of self-
control positively affect the probability of investing in illiquid assets such as 
Superannuation.  Conversely, households with self-control problems were less likely 
to hold assets in a very liquid form such as bank deposits.  Explanations for these 
results are to be found in the psychology and behavioral economics literature that 
deals with the notion of self-control and sophistication.  In particular, households that 
have observed problems of self-control recognize this and succeed somewhat in tying 
their hands.  Three econometric models were specified and results for all robustly 
found that impatience, as measured by a constructed index, and after controlling for 
other household characteristics, significantly and positively affected the probability of 
investing in illiquid assets.
This paper contributes to and complements the literature on household 
saving, household portfolio choice and retirement saving by identifying an additional 
household characteristic that affects investment decisions.  These findings can assist 
in more fully understanding household behavior for the purpose of policy making; 
particularly policy that seeks to encourage and increase private provision for 
retirement.  Recognizing that households are indeed sophisticated, while also 
exhibiting problems of self-control can help in devising innovative long-term 
investment instruments as in Thaler and Benartzi [2004] and others that specifically 
take these problems into account.  If households with problems of self-control are 
more likely to invest in assets that are characterized by illiquidity, then we should be 
encouraging the development of new saving instruments that specifically cater to the 
commitment needs of households. Furthering our understanding of household saving 
can assist in developing incentives for increasing household private wealth 
accumulation for retirement. In addition, this analysis provides evidence that 
households who make use of this type of device are sophisticated hyperbolic 
discounters.23
VII. REFERENCES 
Ainslie, George.  1992.“Picoeconomics,” (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press).
Ainslie, George. 2001. “Breakdown of Will,” (Cambridge University Press).
Ameriks, John, Andrew Caplin and John Leahy. 2003. “Wealth Accumulation and the 
Propensity to Plan,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118(3), pp. 1007-
1047.
Ameriks John, Andrew Caplin, John Leahy and Tom Tyler.  2004. “Measuring Self-
Control,” National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 10514.
Arrondel L. and Bruno Lefebvre. 2001. “Behaviour of household portfolios in France: 
The role of Housing,” ReviewofIncome and Wealth. 47(4) pp. 489-514.
Barsky, Robert B, Juster, F. Thomas,  Miles Kimball, & Matthew D Shapiro. 1997. 
“Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental 
approach in the Health and Retirement Study,”  The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112(2), 729-758. 
Becker, Gary S and Casey B. Mulligan 1997.  “The Endogenous Determination of 
Time Preference.”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), pp.729-758.
Benhabib, Jess and Alberto Bisin. 2004.  “Modeling internal commitment 
mechanisms and self-control: a neuroeconomics approach to consumption 
saving decisions,” forthcoming Games and economic behaviour 2005.
Bertaut, Carol C. and Martha Starr-McCluer. 2001. “Household Portfolios in the 
United States,” In Household Portfolios.  Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (Eds). 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Bickel Warren  K,  Amy L Odum and Gregory J Madden. 1999. “Impulsivity and 
cigarette smoking: delay in current, never and ex-smokers,”
Psychopharmacology 146(4) pp 447-454.
Browning, M and Annamaria Lusardi 1996. “Household saving: micro theories and 
micro facts,” Journal of Economic literature 34 (December), pp. 1797-1855.
Dunteman, G. H, 1989. “Principal components analysis” Series: Quantitative 
Applications in the Social Sciences.  Sage University papers.
Dynan, Karen, Jonathan Skinner and Stephen P. Zeldes, (2004), “Do the rich save 
more?”  Journal of Political Economy, vol 112 (21), pp 397-444.
Fuchs, Victor R., “Time Preference and Health: An Exploratory Study,” in V.R. 
Fuchs, ed., Economic Aspects of Health (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982).
Fudenberg, Drew and David K Levine. 2004. “A Dual Self Model of Impulse 
control,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research working paper.  24
Green, L., Joel Myerson and Pawel Ostaszewski. 1999. “Amount of reward has 
opposite effects on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic outcomes,”  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and cognition. 25(2) 
pp. 418-427.
Greene, W. H. 2003. “Econometric Analysis”. 5
th Edition.  Prentice-Hall. New Jersey.
Haliassos, Michael and Carol C. Bertaut. 1995. “Why do so few hold Stocks?”  The 
Economic Journal, 105(432), pp. 1110-1129.
Hochguertel, S., Rob Alessie and Arthur van Soest. 1997. “Saving Accounts versus 
Stocks and Bonds in Household Portfolio Allocation,” Scandinavian Journal 
ofEconomics. 99(1), pp. 81-97.
Holt, Daniel D., Leonard Green and Joel Myerson. 2003. “Is discounting impulsive? 
Evidence from temporal and probability discounting in gambling and non-
gambling college students,” Behavioural Processes 64 (3) pp 355-367.
Kirby, Kris N. 1997 “Bidding on the future: evidence against normative discounting 
of delayed rewards,” Journal of experimental Psychology (General). 126 (1) 
pp54-70.
Laibson, David. 1997. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 112: pp. 443-478
Laibson David, Andrea Repetto and Jeremy Tobacman. 1998. “Self-control and 
Saving for Retirement,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.1:1998. pp. 
91-196.
Laibson, David, Andrea Repetto and Jeremy Tobacman. 2000.  “A Debt Puzzle,”  
NBER Working Paper 7879.
Lawrance, Emily C. 1991. “Poverty and the Rate of Time preference: evidence from 
Panel Data,” The Journal of Political Economy, 99 (1) pp. 54-77.
Lusardi, Annamaria. 2003. “Planning and saving for retirement,” Mimeo Dartmouth 
College.  Paper presented at the American Economic Association meeting in 
Philadelphia, 2005.
Mitchell, Suzanne H. 1999. “Measures of impulsivity in cigarette smokers and non-
smokers,” Psychopharmacology 146(4) pp 455-464.
Monterosso, John and Ainslie, George.  1999.  “Beyond discounting: possible 
experimental models of impulse control,” Psychopharmacology 146:339–
347.
Myerson, Joel, Leonard Green, J Scott Hanson, Daniel D Holt and Sara J Estle. 2003. 
“Discounting delayed and probabilistic rewards: Processes and traits,” Journal
ofEconomic Psychology. 24 pp. 619-635.
Petry, Nancy M. 2001. “Pathological Gamblers, with and without substance abuse 
disorders, discount delayed rewards at high rates,” Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 110(3) pp. 482-487.25
Petry,  Nancy M. and Thomas Casarella. 1999. “Excessive discounting of delayed 
rewards in substance abusers with gambling problems,” Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence 56 pp. 25–32.
Phelps, Edmund S. and Robert A Pollack. 1968. “On Second-Best National Saving 
and Game-Equilibrium Growth,” The Review of Economic Studies. 35(2). Pp 
185-199.
Strotz, Robert H. 1956. “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility 
Maximization,” Review of Economic Studies 23 (3), pp 165-80
Thaler, Richard. 1981. “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency,” 
Economics Letters, 8, pp.201-207.
Thaler, Richard and Hersh M Shefrin. 1981. “An Economic Theory of self-control,” 
The Journal of Political Economy. 89 (21), pp.392-406.
Thaler, Richard and Shlomo Benartzi. 2004. “Save More Tomorrow©: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 112 (1), pp.164-187.
Vuchinich, Rudy E, Cathy A Simpson. 1998. “Hyperbolic Temporal discounting in 
social drinkers and problem drinkers,” Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology 6(3), pp 292-305.
Zhao, Xueyan and Mark N. Harris. 2004.  “Demand for Marijuana, Alcohol and 
Tobacco: Participation, Levels of Consumption and Cross-Equation 
Correlations,” Economic Record. 80 (251), pp. 394-410.26
VIII.  APPENDIX  
TABLE I: POLYCHORIC CORRELATION MATRIX
Smoke Gamble Drink Credit card debt
Smoke 1
Gamble 0.105 1
Drink 0.213 0.231 1
Credit card debt 0.110 0.129 0.073 1
TABLE II: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
Factors Eigenvalues Proportion explained Cum. explained
1 1.442 0.360 0.360
2 0.942 0.236 0.596
3 0.895 0.224 0.820
4 0.721 0.180 1.000
TABLE III
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Impatience index 3491 0 1 -1.794 1.869
TABLE IV:  IMPATIENCE INDEX
Impatience 
index Behaviour Freq. Percent Cum.
1 -1.794 None 352 10.08 10.08
2 -1.112 Credit card debt only 207 5.93 16.01
3 -0.860 Gambling only 82 2.35 18.36
4 -0.830 Smoke only 157 4.50 22.86
5 -0.710 Drink only 443 12.69 35.55
6 -0.178 Gambling and credit card debt 63 1.80 37.35
7 -0.148 Smoke and credit card debt 145 4.15 41.51
8 -0.028 Drink and credit card debt 319 9.14 50.64
9 0.104 Smoke and gambling 52 1.49 52.13
10 0.223 Gambling and drinking 196 5.61 57.75
11 0.254 Smoke and drink 410 11.74 69.49
12 0.786 Smoke, gamble and credit card debt 58 1.66 71.15
13 0.905 Gamble, Drink and credit card debt 180 5.16 76.31
14 0.936 Smoke, drink and credit card debt 373 10.68 87.00
15 1.187 Smoke, gamble and drink 206 5.90 92.90
16 1.869 Smoke, drink, gamble and credit card debt 248 7.10 100.00
Total 3,491 100
Note: The standardized impatience index consists of 16 unique values. Since there are four behaviours associated 
with self-control problems, there are 15 different combinations of behaviours possible in addition to households 
who do not participate in any of the behaviours.27
TABLE V:  CORRELATIONS BETWEEN IMPATIENCE VARIABLES.
Smoke Drink Gamble Credit card debt
Smoke 1 0.112*** 0.043*** 0.059***
Drink 0.122*** 1 0.133*** 0.027
Gamble 0.064*** 0.142*** 1 0.074***
Credit card debt 0.067*** 0.045*** 0.082*** 1
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. Upper triangle are partial 
correlations, lower triangle are pair wise correlations.
TABLEVI:  CHARACTERISTICS OF  THE SAMPLE







25 – 29  264 -0.012 154 0.010 418
30 – 34   305 -0.042 260 0.044 565
35 – 39   340 -0.017 318 0.068 658
40 – 44  262 0.012 311 0.122 573
45 – 49  212 -0.113 245 0.176 457
50 – 54  178 -0.043 219 -0.030 397
55 – 59   108 -0.075 119 0.071 227
60 – 64   77 -0.265 52 -0.118 129
65 – 69   33 -0.372 5 0.049 38
70 – 74   28 -0.740 1 0.254 29
Education
High school dropout 559 -0.005 379 0.164 938
High school only 189 0.049 190 0.058 379
Intermediate education 731 -0.034 629 0.164 1,360
Higher degree 328 -0.286 486 -0.131 814
Occupation
Managers and administrators 147 -0.102 197 0.095 344
Professionals 366 -0.228 462 -0.106 828
Associate professionals 249 -0.018 267 0.110 516
Tradespersons 
and related workers 278 0.085 211 0.103 489
Advanced clerical and 
service workers 57 -0.086 46 0.328 103
Intermediate clerical, sales and service 233 -0.002 206 0.164 439
Intermediate production and transport workers 195 0.049 149 0.183 344
Elementary clerical, sales and service workers 107 -0.156 68 0.218 175
Labourers and related workers 175 -0.113 78 0.004 253
Gender
Male 1151 -0.025    1252 0.066 2403
Female 656 -0.108   432 0.033 1088
Marital status
Married 1319 -0.004    1340 0.105 2659
Single 488 -0.192  344 -0.127 832
Number of kids under 15
0 959 -0.066 882 0.054 1841
1 331 -0.059 309 0.064 640
2 346 -0.019 333 0.040 679
3+ 171 -0.053 160 0.103 231
All 1,807 -0.062 1,684 0.066 3,491
51.76 % 48.24 %
Household Income            Mean 47513 64466
Median 40664 58682
Mean Value of Dwelling  143283 157630
Source: Author’s tabulation from 1998-99 HES.  Frequency and proportions of households contributing to 
superannuation.  N=3491, ages 25 – 74 inclusive. Unemployed and those not in the labour force are excluded.  
Impatience index constructed using principalcomponents analysis on smoking, drinking, gambling, and credit card 
debt.28
TABLE VII:  ASSET OWNERSHIP
Total No super Super
(n) (n) Avg. impatience (n) Avg. impatience
Stocks 791 325 -0.122 466 -0.029
Home owner 2544 1252 -0.037 1292 -0.065
Property owner 455 190 -0.024 265 0.030
Bank deposits 1001 448 -0.192 553 -0.003
FIGURE I














































































Note:  Age categories 9 and 10 for households with super are not strictly valid since they include only 5 and 1 observations, 
respectively.
Key to figure III
1: 25-29 years 6:50-54 years
2: 30-34 years 7:55-59 years
3: 35-39 years 8:60-64 years
4: 40-44 years 9:65-69 years



























Key to figure IV.
1-school only 5-undergrad dip
2- bas voc 6-bachelor 
3-skill voc 7-postgrad diploma























Note:  Category 1 is only illiquid assets held and category 5 is only liquid assets held.  Intermediate categories are in decreasing 
liquidity.  Illiquid assets include superannuation, residence and property.  Liquid assets include bank deposits and stocks.31











Age squared -0.0011*** -0.0004
(-5.40)
HH income (no investment)/1 000 0.0062*** 0.0025
(6.78)
High school only† 0.1725** 0.0687
(2.05)
Intermediate education† 0.0320 0.0128
(0.53)
Higher Degree† 0.2208*** 0.0879
(2.77)
Gender† (Male=0) -0.2461*** -0.0974
(-4.54)
Family size -0.0202 -0.0080
(-0.95)
Marriage † 0.0298 0.0119
(0.43)




Associate Professionals† 0.2807*** 0.1115
(2.64)
Tradespersons & related workers† 0.1339 0.0534
(1.23)
Advanced Clerical & Service workers† 0.3510** 0.1386
(2.21)
Intermediate Clerical, Sales & Service workers† 0.3301*** 0.1309
(3.05)
Intermediate production & transport workers† 0.1461 0.0582
(1.31)
Elementary clerical, sales & service workers† 0.2912** 0.1155
(2.20)
Home owner† 0.2662*** 0.1051
(4.02)
Home owner*dwelling value/10 000 -0.0115*** -0.0046
(-5.14)
Dividend income dummy† 0.2141*** 0.0852
(3.75)
Dividend dummy*dividend income -0.0002 -0.0001
(-0.76)
Property income dummy† 0.0767 0.0306
(1.10)
Bank income dummy† 0.2101*** 0.0836
(3.79)
Bank interest dummy*bank interest income -0.0037*** -0.0015
(-2.92)
Property dummy*property income -0.0003 -0.0001
(-0.96)
Principal income – wages† 0.9208*** 0.3333
(6.28)
Principal income – self employed† 0.4078** 0.1607
(2.53)





Wald chi2(29) = 433.73
Log pseudo likelihood = -2159.24
Pseudo R2 = 0.1069
Per cent correctly predicted = 65.77%
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
† indicates dummy variable and marginal effects are for discrete changeof dummy variable from 0 to 1.  Robust standard errors.32
TABLE IX:  MULTIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATION.
Multivariate Probit Superannuation Stocks Property
Bank
Deposits Home
Impatience 0.0596** -0.0658** -0.0073 -0.0971*** 0.0102
(2.31) (-2.31) (-0.23) (-3.57) (0.36)
Age 0.1063*** 0.0186 0.1155*** 0.0412** 0.1005***
(6.31) (1.04) (4.91) (2.32) (5.52)
Age squared -0.0011*** -0.0000 -0.0011*** -0.0002 -0.0007***
(-5.76) (-0.17) (-4.17) (-1.03) (-3.58)
HH income (no investment)/1000 0.0057*** 0.0042*** 0.0038*** 0.0034*** 0.0033***
(6.19) (5.09) (4.32) (4.29) (3.13)
Marriage† 0.0576 0.1183 0.3545*** 0.2485*** 0.5346***
(0.84) (1.55) (3.80) (3.48) (7.16)
Gender†(Male=0) -0.2447*** -0.1177** -0.0818 -0.0250 -0.0252
(-4.55) (-1.96) (-1.18) (-0.44) (-0.43)
Family size -0.0292 -0.0034 -0.0137 -0.1006*** 0.0721***
(-1.39) (-0.14) (-0.52) (-4.51) (2.94)
Managers & Administrators† 0.3216*** 0.5538*** 0.5941*** 0.2619** 0.1476
(2.72) (3.98) (3.48) (2.18) (1.18)
Professionals† 0.2940*** 0.4507*** 0.4933*** 0.0815 0.1674
(2.75) (3.40) (3.01) (0.73) (1.49)
Associate Professionals† 0.2744*** 0.5697*** 0.4880*** 0.1135 0.2538**
(2.62) (4.35) (3.01) (1.03) (2.30)
Tradespersons & related workers† 0.1598 0.3757*** 0.2693 -0.0097 0.2581**
(1.49) (2.82) (1.57) (-0.09) (2.29)
Advanced Clerical & Service workers† 0.3587** 0.6378*** 0.7228*** 0.0871 0.4504***
(2.28) (3.53) (3.50) (0.51) (2.63)
Intermediate Clerical, Sales & Service workers† 0.3418*** 0.4184*** 0.3981** 0.1128 0.3027***
(3.20) (3.09) (2.38) (1.00) (2.74)
Intermediate production & transport workers† 0.1398 -0.0094 0.3346* -0.1392 -0.0198
(1.26) (-0.06) (1.95) (-1.15) (-0.17)
Elementary clerical, sales & service workers† 0.2869** 0.3272** 0.3168 0.1652 -0.1184
(2.20) (1.98) (1.59) (1.19) (-0.90)
High school only† 0.1660** 0.1911** 0.2201** -0.0139 0.0467
(2.00) (2.06) (2.02) (-0.16) (0.53)
Intermediate education† 0.0277 0.1737** 0.1179 0.0803 0.1457**
(0.46) (2.50) (1.48) (1.25) (2.21)
Higher Degree† 0.2109*** 0.3813*** 0.2353** 0.2090** 0.1959**
(2.69) (4.38) (2.43) (2.54) (2.24)
Principal income – wages† 0.9345*** 0.1901 0.1145 0.2766** 0.1582
(6.46) (1.33) (0.65) (2.24) (1.32)
Principal income – self employed† 0.4044** 0.0111 0.1304 0.1956 0.4506***
(2.55) (0.07) (0.68) (1.39) (3.23)
Principal income – investments† 0.2659 0.7044*** 0.7404*** 0.7510*** 0.2772
(1.26) (3.62) (3.22) (4.08) (1.38)
Constant  -3.8099*** -2.5417*** -5.0815*** -2.4434*** -3.3645***
(-10.19) (-6.29) (-9.43) (-6.21) (-8.55)
Estimatesoferror Correlations
r with superannuation ------- 0.1190*** 0.0538 0.0928*** 0.0530*
------- (3.84) (1.48) (3.10) (1.71)
r with stocks ------- ------- 0.1736*** 0.2831*** 0.1665***
------- ------- (4.74) (9.39) (4.80)
r with property ------- ------- ------- 0.1525*** -0.0002
------- ------- ------- (4.34) (-0.01)
r with bank deposits  ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.1119***
------- ------- ------- ------- (3.40)
N = 3491
Log Pseudo likelihood = -8820.94
Wald chi2 (105) = 1346.07
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Multivariate Probit estimation using the GHK simulated ML method with robust standard errors.   
Based on 60 draws.  Coefficients with z-score in parentheses.33
TABLE X: LIQUID AND ILLIQUID ASSET HOLDINGS.
Number of Illiquid
assets held
Number of Liquid 
assets held
0 1 2 3 Total
404 946 651 68 2,069
0 19.53 45.72 31.46 3.29 100
78.75 63.32 51.54 30.77 59.27
91 417 444 100 1,052
1 8.65 39.64 42.21 9.51 100
17.74 27.91 35.15 45.25 30.13
18 131 168 53 370
2 4.86 35.41 45.41 14.32 100
3.51 8.77 13.3 23.98 10.6
513 1,494 1,263 221 3,491
Total 14.69 42.8 36.18 6.33 100
100 100 100 100 100
Distribution and frequencies of the number of liquid and illiquid asset holdings by households.
Key to Table X  
Frequency     




0 404 No assets held
1 1,665 Only illiquid assets held
2 597 Mostly illiquid assets
3 585 Equal holding of illiquid and liquid
4 131 Mostly liquid assets held
5 109 Only liquid assets held
Number of households by liquidity category.  Category zero represents no assets held34
TABLE XII:  LIQUIDITY AND IMPATIENCE.
Multinomial Logit estimation. Liquidity Categories – category 1 omitted (only illiquidassets held)
0
No assets
2 3 4 5
liquid assets
only
Impatience -0.1372* -0.1168** -0.1709*** -0.3439*** -0.2437*
(-1.89) (-2.05) (-2.97) (-3.40) (-1.94)
Age -0.2100*** 0.1751*** 0.0023 -0.1089* -0.0811
(-4.72) (4.11) (0.06) (-1.86) (-1.07)
Age squared 0.0019*** -0.0015*** 0.0003 0.0016** 0.0006
(3.62) (-3.06) (0.66) (2.52) (0.66)
HH income (no investment)/1000 -0.0177*** 0.0107*** 0.0039** 0.0034 -0.0093*
(-4.70) (6.29) (2.00) (1.02) (-1.83)
High school only† -0.3416 0.4704** -0.0538 0.0736 -0.0089
(-1.63) (2.45) (-0.29) (0.19) (-0.02)
Intermediate education† -0.2578* 0.4876*** 0.0114 0.1977 0.2449
(-1.68) (3.44) (0.08) (0.73) (0.86)
Higher Degree† -0.4642** 0.7219*** 0.1690 0.7538** 0.3286
(-1.98) (4.17) (0.98) (2.33) (0.80)
Gender†(Male=0) 0.4354*** 0.0466 -0.0142 0.0574 -0.0975
(3.08) (0.37) (-0.12) (0.24) (-0.38)
Family size -0.1591** -0.1142** -0.1268*** -0.1217 -0.3013***
(-2.42) (-2.54) (-2.70) (-1.32) (-2.63)
Marriage † -0.4212** 0.6241*** 0.1872 0.1597 -0.2042
(-2.31) (3.80) (1.23) (0.60) (-0.68)
Managers & Administrators† -0.8515** 0.6740** 0.5309** 0.5792 0.3061
(-2.43) (2.22) (2.08) (1.16) (0.62)
Professionals† -0.3943 0.4199 0.2088 0.2068 0.0949
(-1.51) (1.46) (0.88) (0.43) (0.20)
Associate Professionals† -0.6771** 0.4988* 0.3812* 0.4611 -0.4621
(-2.64) (1.74) (1.65) (0.97) (-0.96)
Tradespersons & related workers† -0.3110 0.4007 0.0117 -0.1222 0.0834
(-1.28) (1.37) (0.05) (-0.23) (0.19)
Advanced Clerical & Service workers† -0.8905** 0.8437** -0.0229 0.7022 -27.9524***
(-2.33) (2.22) (-0.06) (1.08) (-68.81)
Intermediate Clerical, Sales & Service workers† -0.7857*** 0.5324* 0.0433 0.5131 -0.4301
(-3.24) (1.81) (0.18) (1.05) (-0.90)
Intermediate production & transport workers† -0.0616 0.1359 -0.5178* -0.5717 -0.0965
(-0.26) (0.43) (-1.92) (-0.93) (-0.20)
Elementary clerical, sales & service workers† -0.1013 0.4928 0.0031 0.7342 0.3151
(-0.37) (1.33) (0.01) (1.31) (0.62)
Principal income – wages† -0.3487 0.8891** 0.2700 -0.0813 -0.3874
(-1.50) (2.17) (0.99) (-0.18) (-0.90)
Principal income – self employed† -0.7881*** 0.3293 0.1869 0.0678 -1.3464**
(-2.70) (0.75) (0.62) (0.14) (-2.28)
Principal income – investments† -0.0548 1.5408*** 1.3057*** 1.5601*** 0.5608
(-0.11) (2.88) (3.22) (2.77) (0.81)
Constant  6.0594*** -8.2536*** -2.1095** -1.5665 1.2233
(6.62) (-8.50) (-2.54) (-1.12) (0.72)
N=3491.   
Log pseudo likelihood = -4555.11
Pseudo R = 0.0910
Wald chi2(105) = 33008.82
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. † Indicates dummy variables